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Structured Products

May 8, 2017 by

Chris Priebe
Structured Products Strategy and Trading

Subprime Auto ABS has been a prominent headline recently with multiple articles suggesting that increased delinquencies are a sign of a bubble getting ready to burst, similar to the mortgage crisis of several years ago.   So AAM took a look behind the headlines.

What does a Subprime Borrower Look Like?

Obviously, a borrower who falls into the subprime category is someone who is considered a higher-than-normal risk. Very often individuals find themselves in the subprime category due to one significant occurrence or due to a series of unfortunate events. Bad investments, a failed business, debilitating student loans, loss of employment, catastrophic medical bills and many other circumstances can quickly force people into precarious financial situations.

So what is the profile of a subprime borrower? They may have a history of late or missed payments, default debt, excessive debt, and personal bankruptcy or have few or no assets. As a result, they can only qualify for higher interest rate consumer debt and consequently, pay more in interest for mortgages, credit cards, car loans and car leases. In the United States subprime borrowers are typically categorized as individuals with FICO scores of below 640.

In 2008, subprime lending to people who may not otherwise have qualified lead to the mortgage crisis. Per JP Morgan, roughly 70%-80% of subprime borrowers were issued adjustable rate mortgages and when those loans adjusted to higher interest rates, refinancing was difficult due to declining home values. This resulted in a widespread domino crisis beginning with mortgage defaults which lead to foreclosures and eventually resulted in the declining value of mortgage-backed securities and a meltdown of the entire system.

Is that same trend happening today in Auto ABS?

In AAM’s review of data and information from multiple sources, the good news is that a mortgage-like meltdown does not seem imminent in the Auto ABS sector.  According to JP Morgan:

  • Subprime and deep subprime loans are a relatively small portion of new sales;
  • Delinquency increases have been modest outside of subprime;
  • Loan duration has seen no recent inflection;
  • Premiums to US Treasuries that auto finance companies must pay have moderated.

JP Morgan goes on to state:

“Auto ABS collateral performance shows signs of deterioration in aggregate with the belief based on history that there will likely be a shakeout and/or consolidation of lenders.  However, the feeling is that Auto ABS structures remain sound in spite of potentially higher losses.”

According to Deutsche Bank, the number of cars registered per household is as high as ever at 2.25 and most auto loans are issued to super-prime borrowers.  Also, per JP Morgan, new car loan FICO scores remain flat at 711 going back to 2015, and while delinquencies have risen, they have not done so sharply.    Although loan durations reached an average of 68 months in 2016 this increase is the result of longer average length of ownership and vehicle durability.  It appears that it is well qualified buyers who are driving up loan durations due to continuously increasing new car prices.

So Why the Headlines?

The reason for the worrisome headlines is because subprime Auto ABS cumulative net losses appear to continue to climb.  According to Merrill Lynch, cumulative net losses for the 2014-2015 vintages are higher than the 2011-2013 vintages for sub prime issuers in aggregate.  And, the 2015 vintage is tracking higher than those for the 2007 vintage.

Non-prime auto loan ABS – Cumulative Net Losses

Source: Intex, BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

However, it must be noted that in comparing 2007 vintages to 2015 vintages, the latter includes additional and new lenders who focus on the deep subprime market, thereby skewing the results.  When the data is normalized to compare similar types of lenders between periods, the 2015 vintage performs much better than 2007.  According to Merrill Lynch, “Specifically, at 15 months of seasoning, the 2015 vintage has CNL of 4.3% while the 2007 vintage has CNL of 8.4%.  Unadjusted, the CNL would be 6.6% for the 2015 vintage and 6.2% for the 2007 vintage.”  So, as JP Morgan states, the sky is not falling on the automotive finance industry.

Non-prime Auto Loan ABS – Cumulative Net Losses – Normalized
2007 v. 2015

Source: Intex, BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

But there are some negative trends that warrant attention in the future, including:

  • Car dealer inventories are rising as more vehicles come off leases;
  • Lease penetration has risen to new highs as consumers search for ways to offset higher new vehicle prices;
  • Even more vehicles will come off lease in the next three years;
  • Overall auto loan delinquency rate has moved slightly higher due to uptick in subprime delinquencies

What Does This Mean for AAM Clients?

At AAM, we believe that subprime auto loan performance will continue to deteriorate in 2017 and 2018, although at a slow rate.   Similar to earlier cycles, credit expansion in deep subprime auto lending is moving credit performance to weaker levels. The make up of more recent subprime lenders accessing the ABS market has dramatically changed since the 2008 recession.  Lender and product mix and weaker vehicle prices could drive losses higher.  The current level of enhancement for most auto ABS should limit the downside risk for these subprime deals.

Auto headlines will continue to hit news wires. Used car supply has close to doubled since 2011 and 2012. Higher than usual lease sales will continue to put pressure on supply in the future considering that 30% of all sales are now leases, which is up from 20% a few years back. Close to four million cars annually will be coming off lease in 2017 thru 2019 up from two million annually just a few years ago. AAM structures and light exposure to benchmark subprime ABS autos is nominal and we look to use any widening as an opportunity to add to senior bonds.

At AAM, we still view benchmark ABS issuers in prime auto loans, high quality credit cards, rate reduction, rail car and equipment ABS as a safe haven in structured products. The auto market is seeing tiering in the weaker and new sponsor names but we don’t see a systematic subprime auto breakdown ahead. The market will see spread separation in the usual benchmark subprime issuers versus the deep subprime entrants the market has recently seen.

Despite the subprime credit deterioration news, economic expansion and respectable wage growth is supportive for a majority of the ABS market. While we do see worse credit performance ahead in the student loan market place, consumer lending and deep subprime auto, we believe ABS investors will be well protected by their structures and credit support.

 

 


Disclaimer: Asset Allocation & Management Company, LLC (AAM) is an investment adviser registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, specializing in fixed-income asset management services for insurance companies. Registration does not imply a certain level of skill or training. This information was developed using publicly available information, internally developed data and outside sources believed to be reliable.  While all reasonable care has been taken to ensure that the facts stated and the opinions given are accurate, complete and reasonable, liability is expressly disclaimed by AAM and any affiliates (collectively known as “AAM”), and their representative officers and employees.  This report has been prepared for informational purposes only and does not purport to represent a complete analysis of any security, company or industry discussed. Any opinions and/or recommendations expressed are subject to change without notice and should be considered only as part of a diversified portfolio. A complete list of investment recommendations made during the past year is available upon request. Past performance is not an indication of future returns. This information is distributed to recipients including AAM, any of which may have acted on the basis of the information, or may have an ownership interest in securities to which the information relates.  It may also be distributed to clients of AAM, as well as to other recipients with whom no such client relationship exists.  Providing this information does not, in and of itself, constitute a recommendation by AAM, nor does it imply that the purchase or sale of any security is suitable for the recipient. Investing in the bond market is subject to certain risks including market, interest-rate, issuer, credit, inflation, liquidity, valuation, volatility, prepayment and extension. No part of this material may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission.

January 21, 2015 by

Standard and Poor’s Settles Ratings Methodology and Practices Misconduct Charges with the SEC

The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced that they had settled with Standard and Poor’s (S&P) on charges of fraudulent misconduct in rating commercial mortgaged backed securities (CMBS) post credit crisis. According to the settlement, S&P will not be rating multi-loan (conduit) CMBS transactions until January 21, 2016, due to applying different methodologies to issue preliminary ratings and surveillance of these transactions back in 2011. However, S&P, will continue to rate all other type of CMBS transactions and will continue to monitor and maintain rating on previously rated CMBS transactions.

S&P will pay $58 million to the SEC in fines for their misconduct and an additional $19 million to settle with the Attorney General’s offices of New York and Massachusetts.  They also agreed to retract a “misleading” study they had published supporting their methodologies based on flawed and inappropriate assumptions.  The SEC claimed that the study did not completely describe certain aspects of the criteria in the study.

We believe the restriction on S&P from rating any future conduit CMBS transactions will have minimal impact on the CMBS market as S&P’s rated only 3 out of 40 or 9% of the market in 2014. The SEC’s action of banning S&P also supports our CMBS outlook that conduit CMBS underwriting has been and continues to be of average quality. We continue to monitor and remain cognizant of the risks in the current CMBS market. AAM continues to prefer single asset transactions with lower leverage relative to conduit transactions.

Mohammed Ahmed
Structured Products Analyst

December 19, 2012 by

It’s a countdown to the 2012 National Association of Insurance Commissioners unveiling of the recovery values for the more than $100 billion of non-agency mortgage backed securities held in  insurance company portfolios.  Despite anticipated model changes that will materially lower recovery values, we expect the non-agency secondary market prices to hold up extremely well. 


 

The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) will be releasing their 2012 model recovery values for the non-agency residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) market on Friday December 21, 2012. The NAIC task force approved a new model in October that will require insurance companies to re-evaluate the amount of capital these entities hold versus their $123 billion non-agency RMBS portfolios.  We believe that this new model will result in lower recovery values and higher capital requirements. Despite these changes, we expect the non-agency secondary trading market to remain very well bid and do not anticipate prices declining despite the lower NAIC evaluations.

The new capital requirements will be based on the commission’s economic/housing model with different weightings and more conservative assumptions than in the previous three years.  NAIC employs a proprietary model created by PIMCO to generate expected cash flows or recovery values that generate NAIC ratings levels.  This model incorporates the following factors:  a macro economic model, percentages of the Case Shiller Housing Price index, the National Unemployment Rate, the Consumer Price Index, Gross Domestic Product, a mortgage loan credit model and a capital structure model. All these factors are used in determining the recovery values for each individual security in the NAIC database.

The creation and use of recovery values to set NAIC ratings levels has allowed insurance companies to purchase lower rated and non-investment grade securities as well as to hold legacy assets while requiring less capital to be held against those holdings.  These changes have made the non-agency market very attractive to insurance companies with the sophistication to analyze and invest in non-investment grade mortgage backed securities.

We believe that the database release will expand the existing lull of insurance company non-agency RMBS buying through year end, while companies wait and assess the new NAIC recovery levels. In general, we are not forecasting material declines in secondary market prices as changes in demand should be minimal.  Insurance companies own approximately 11% of the non-agency residential mortgage backed securities outstanding, according to recent Bank of America data. The size of the insurance portfolio is still a small enough percentage of the overall market where selling and heavier supply would represent modest pressure on prices.

The new weightings and assumptions were released by the NAIC in October, and are listed in Exhibit 1.  Four out of the five scenarios are worse than the 2009, 2010 and 2011 models. The base case scenario is essentially unchanged. The primary adjustment added an incremental 10% weight to a housing scenario where prices bottom out a full 60% below 2006 peak valuations.  That translates into an incremental 30% drop from current valuations.  The table suggests that the more conservatively weighted model will create lower NAIC prices.

Source: NAIC, Bank of America, Nomura
Source: NAIC, Bank of America, Nomura

We expect senior, Prime bonds to drop anywhere from one to three points, potentially causing recent NAIC 1 purchases to drop into the NAIC 2 category level, and in some cases NAIC 3 level.  Alt-A and Subprime bonds could drop in the neighborhood of two to five points. Mezzanine bonds could see valuation levels decline as much as ten points or more. AAM feels that the model penalizes holders of this paper given the 5% rise in national Housing Price Appreciation (HPA) in 2012. We don’t agree with the new approach. However, despite the more conservative model, we believe this should not cause major problems for most senior securities.

Approximately 80% of the $123 billion non-agency RMBS held by insurance companies consists of NAIC 1 and 2 rated bonds. Of these bonds, 72% are currently carried as NAIC 1 and 8% as NAIC 2 rated bonds.  The remaining 20% of the insurance companies exposure carries NAIC 3, 4 and 5 ratings (8%, 8% and 4%, respectively).   The end result of the implementation of the new model will be lower recovery values for a large number of non-agency RMBS.  The model will present downward price recovery pressure on NAIC 3 to 5 rated securities. Conversely, the stronger performing senior bonds will drop substantially less for the NAIC 1 and 2 rated bonds. So come late Friday, we will see exactly how much NAIC evaluations have dropped.

Christopher M. Priebe
Vice President
Mortgage Backed Securities Trader

For more information, contact:

Colin T. Dowdall, CFA
Director of Marketing and Business Development
colin.dowdall@aamcompany.com


Disclaimer: Asset Allocation & Management Company, LLC (AAM) is an investment adviser registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, specializing in fixed-income asset management services for insurance companies. This information was developed using publicly available information, internally developed data and outside sources believed to be reliable. While all reasonable care has been taken to ensure that the facts stated and the opinions given are accurate, complete and reasonable, liability is expressly disclaimed by AAM and any affiliates (collectively known as “AAM”), and their representative officers and employees. This report has been prepared for informational purposes only and does not purport to represent a complete analysis of any security, company or industry discussed. Any opinions and/or recommendations expressed are subject to change without notice and should be considered only as part of a diversified portfolio. A complete list of investment recommendations made during the past year is available upon request. Past performance is not an indication of future returns.

This information is distributed to recipients including AAM, any of which may have acted on the basis of the information, or may have an ownership interest in securities to which the information relates. It may also be distributed to clients of AAM, as well as to other recipients with whom no such client relationship exists. Providing this information does not, in and of itself, constitute a recommendation by AAM, nor does it imply that the purchase or sale of any security is suitable for the recipient. Investing in the bond market is subject to certain risks including market, interest-rate, issuer, credit, inflation, liquidity, valuation, volatility, prepayment and extension. No part of this material may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission.

December 21, 2011 by

Commercial mortgage backed security issuance has rebounded dramatically since the depths of the financial crisis.  While many of the egregious lending practices of the past have been rectified, there are elements of recent transactions that pose risks to investors.


The Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities (CMBS) market underwent a rapid transformation from late 2009 through 2011, growing from a market of small, single borrower deals to larger, multiple borrower transactions. Strong demand for these deals, “CMBS 2.0” as they are popularly known, from both traditional and non-traditional participants, helped restore vibrancy and liquidity to the marketplace following the collapse of issuance in 2008.  Despite increases in origination volume and transaction size over the past two years, CMBS 2.0 deals can be characterized as having relatively few underlying loans as well as lacking diversification in both underlying property type and geographic location. In addition, the original conservative underwriting standards prevalent in the first few transactions issued in 2009 have given way to aggressive origination practices, which has led to loans with lower debt service coverage ratios (DSCR) and higher loan to value ratios (LTV), and, to a lesser extent, include some pro forma underwriting. We believe that at current yield spreads, investors are not fully compensated for the risk and volatility that is inherent in these new deals.

The first newly issued CMBS transaction, following the collapse of the structured securities market, occurred in November of 2009 after a nearly two year hiatus.  This initial transaction was backed by a single loan covering a small collection of retail properties made to one borrower, Developers Diversified Realty (DDR).  Given that the trauma of the financial crisis was fresh in investor’s minds, the underlying loan had very conservative lending metrics with a DSCR of 2.04x and an LTV of just 51.7%.   This transaction was extremely well received and based upon this positive market feedback, loan originators again began extending credit to developers for securitization in future CMBS transactions.  These new CMBS 2.0 transactions quickly evolved into more traditional conduit deals backed by multiple loans, covering several different property types made to a variety of lenders.  The quality of the underlying loans remained quite strong as these early securitizations were backed by loans with credit metrics very similar to the DDR deal.

While the initial credit metrics were strong, the CMBS 2.0 transactions had much greater loan concentration due to the size of the loans and the relatively small number of loans backing each transaction.   The average 2007 securitization contained 200 loans averaging less than $10 million per loan while the new securitizations contained only 30 to 50 loans and averaged $30 million per loan.  As a result, the top ten loans in a CMBS 2.0 transaction make up a disproportionate percentage of each deal.  Historically, the top ten loans in transactions issued between 2004 and 2007 period made up between 30% and 45% of the underlying pool, while the top ten loans for deals underwritten in 2010 and 2011 averaged 69% and 62% of the pool respectively.  This concentration increases the overall risk of the pool as the default of a single loan will have a dramatic impact on the overall credit performance of a securitization.

CMBS 2.0 transaction also lack diversified property types.  Retail properties and office buildings comprise approximately 50% and 30%, respectively, of the underlying collateral pools.  A large portion of these are located in tertiary locations such as regional malls and suburban office buildings.  The tenants in secondary locations may not be as financially strong as those in primary central business districts and the time and cost to replace a tenant in the event of a vacancy can be much more difficult and expensive.

Evaluating these concentration risks becomes especially important as increased competition among lenders has led to a loosening of underwriting standards.  Exhibit 1 presents the declining average DSCR and increasing LTV ratio in recent CMBS 2.0 transactions.  The rating agency stressed DSCR for GSMS 2010-C1 A2 (issued in 2010) was 1.45x, and the stressed LTV was 70.8%, as compared to an average for all transactions issued in 2011 of 1.24x and 90.6%, respectively. While this trend is troublesome, these metrics still compare favorably to the averages at the market peak in 2007 when stressed DSCR averaged 0.98x and stressed LTV averaged 110.6%.

Screen Shot 2016-01-26 at 18.10.10

Interestingly, interest only loans are becoming more prevalent, constituting approximately 21% of newly originated CMBS transactions.  The lower debt service costs of an interest only loan make DSCR appear to be more conservative but in reality mask the risk in the underlying collateral pool.  The lack of principal repayments during the term of the loan makes them more difficult to refinance at maturity leading to increased default risk.

Current underwriting trends in CMBS 2.0 transactions are troubling.  Collateral pools concentrated in a relatively few regional malls and suburban office parks make these securitizations particularly risky.  In the event of another broad based downturn in the commercial real estate market, the concentration in these securitizations make them much more vulnerable to credit downgrade and to principal losses on lower rated classes.  Had the conservative underwriting standards of the first few transactions issued in 2010 been maintained, the risks would be manageable, however in light of the erosion of those standards, we feel that the return potential is not sufficient to offset the risks.  As long as senior securities are offered with yields that are comparable to government guaranteed GNMA project loans, we’ll choose to avoid this sector for now.

Mohammed Z. Ahmed
Assistant Vice President
Structured Products Analyst

For more information, contact:

Joel B. Cramer, CFA
Director of Sales and Marketing
joel.cramer@aamcompany.com

Greg Curran, CFA
Vice President, Business Development
greg.curran@aamcompany.com


Disclaimer: Asset Allocation & Management Company, LLC (AAM) is an investment adviser registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, specializing in fixed-income asset management services for insurance companies. This information was developed using publicly available information, internally developed data and outside sources believed to be reliable. While all reasonable care has been taken to ensure that the facts stated and the opinions given are accurate, complete and reasonable, liability is expressly disclaimed by AAM and any affiliates (collectively known as “AAM”), and their representative officers and employees. This report has been prepared for informational purposes only and does not purport to represent a complete analysis of any security, company or industry discussed. Any opinions and/or recommendations expressed are subject to change without notice and should be considered only as part of a diversified portfolio. A complete list of investment recommendations made during the past year is available upon request. Past performance is not an indication of future returns.

This information is distributed to recipients including AAM, any of which may have acted on the basis of the information, or may have an ownership interest in securities to which the information relates. It may also be distributed to clients of AAM, as well as to other recipients with whom no such client relationship exists. Providing this information does not, in and of itself, constitute a recommendation by AAM, nor does it imply that the purchase or sale of any security is suitable for the recipient. Investing in the bond market is subject to certain risks including market, interest-rate, issuer, credit, inflation, liquidity, valuation, volatility, prepayment and extension. No part of this material may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission.

December 2, 2011 by

Agency Mortgage Backed Security prepayments have been a topic of concern for mortgage market investors. Will there be a universal mortgage rate, a refinance wave or gradual changes to existing mortgage programs?  In this article, we will review the prepayment mechanics of the agency mortgage market that is insured by Fannie Mae (Federal National Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Association).


Over the past year, there have been a great number of rumors regarding a universal refinancing wave in the GSE (Government Sponsored Entities) agency mortgage market. We have witnessed a variety of national news stories regarding a government sponsored refinance wave and national media reports of a potential single thirty-year mortgage rate for every homeowner. These types of rumors have created many unpredictable days for the agency mortgage market and its investors. Despite the hearsay infiltrating the market, we do not believe that a universal refinance wave is likely.

In an effort to eliminate rumors and volatility in the market, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) stated on October 24, 2011 that any new initiatives seeking to facilitate mortgage refinancing will be limited to the revamping of existing programs. Changes to the present refinancing plan, the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP), must be implemented in a manner that protects the taxpayers’ commitment to the GSE. The acting FHFA director, Edward DeMarco emphasized that while he was in favor of a program to aid homeowners, as the conservator of the GSE, he could only consider a plan that:

  1. Conserves the assets of the Government Sponsored Entities (GSEs)
  2. Preserves the liquidity and stability of the mortgage market and
  3. Helps homeowners while considering the costs to taxpayers

The HARP program was initiated on March 4, 2009. The program was put into practice to help current and responsible homeowners refinance at today’s lower mortgage rates, despite sharp decreases in home values. The government program was expected to help between 4 and 5 million homeowners when activated in April 2009. As of July 2011, however, only 20% of those homeowners were actually able to refinance. The program’s initial termination date was intended to be June 30, 2010 and has been extended three times now. The new termination date is December 31, 2013.

On Monday, November 15, 2011 the FHFA sent out a press release regarding the changes to the existing HARP program. Due to the mandates of the FHFA, those tweaks to the  program did not create a massive refinancing wave. The changes are outlined below:

  • Reducing risk based fees – Loan Level Pricing Adjustments (LLPAs)
  • Elimination of the 125% LTV (loan to value) ceiling for fixed rate mortgage loans
  • Adjustments to representations and warranties
  • Streamline some property appraisals
  • New program effective December 1, 2011
  • HARP extension to December 31, 2013

The removal of Loan Level Pricing Adjustments will lower the cost of refinancing and encourage more borrowers to refinance. LLPAs were increased by both agencies in 2008 causing some of the recent difficulties in refinancing. LLPAs are special fees charged by the GSEs to guarantee any loan with a low credit score (FICO score), a higher LTV (loan to value) ratio or a feature deemed risky by the agencies (e.g., higher debt to income ratios, investor properties, second home, etc.). These fees generally range from 0.25% to 2%, but have been as high as 3%. There was a recent cap at 2% for certain loans that the agencies refinance from their own portfolio. Many times these fees were paid upfront or rolled into the total mortgage.  When you look into the raw numbers of an extra 2% or a 3% fee ($8,340 or $12,510, respectively) on a $417,000 loan, it’s obvious why this could impede a homeowner to refinance. Reducing these LLPAs will increase prepayment mildly.

Another change is eliminating the 125% LTV cap and streamlining some property appraisals in certain qualified areas. Removing the LTV cap will help a small percentage of underwater homeowners (home is worth less than they paid) become eligible to refinance. An estimate of qualified HARP homeowners that hold an agency mortgage with an extremely high LTV is said to be about 1% to 2% of the agency mortgage universe. A small percentage of homes  will not require appraisals  but will be valued using a GSE’s housing model that will ease the refinancing process.

Changes to representations and warranties can be the most complicated HARP alteration. A change to “reps and warranties” essentially revisits underwriting flaws for lower creditworthy borrowers. It seemed to be a trend in the past that the insufficient mortgage underwriting was focused on the lower creditworthy and lower documentation type borrowers. Originators “supposedly” had confirmed property valuations, borrower’s incomes, assets, employment, etc. at origination. If the originator cannot prove the loan was adequately underwritten, the GSE can force the servicer to buy the loan back (called a “put back”) in a new mortgage default.

It seems that this “put back” capability by the GSE hindered certain loans from being refinanced by the mortgage originator. One main reason for this problem is if these loans did default within 12 months of a refinancing, the originators are responsible for the loss. The loss would be assumed to be 40 to 60 cents on the dollar for each mortgage when the loan is put back. The originators today are unwilling to rep and warrant many of the older “qualified” borrowers of years past because of this potential put back loss. This potential default on a less creditworthy borrower and fear by the mortgage originator has slowed the HARP refinance program. In general, the detailed changes were minimal on reps and warranties for Fannie Mae and a little more meaningful for Freddie Mac, who waived most reps and warrants.

To qualify for the program, the loan must be a first lien and owned or guaranteed by either agency. Loans that originated and sold into private label securitizations are ineligible for the HARP program. In addition, the mortgage must be current for Freddie Mac (no late payment within the last 12 months) and the qualifier can only have been 30+ days delinquent once in the last 12 months for a Fannie Mae loan. Based on Mortgage Bankers Association statistics, we have seen 30+ days delinquencies on mortgage payments reach as high a 10% nationally and now has dropped to the 8.5% area. These numbers alone eliminate more than 8% of the market from possible refinancing.

Recent Agency Mortgage Prepayment Speeds

It’s interesting to compare historical prepayment speeds across different MBS to see exactly how speeds have changed from historic norms. The lack of credit available to lower FICO borrowers and the ineffectiveness of the original refinance program has prevented many homeowners with a 5.5% to 7% mortgage rate from refinancing. If you look at Exhibit 1 for the generic 30-year Fannie Mae guaranteed mortgages this month, you will notice that the higher coupon borrowers are prepaying more slowly relative to lower interest rate borrowers. Of note are the 6% through 6.5% coupons. These coupons are paying slower than 4.5% through 5.5% coupons. In past low interest rate environments, 30-year 6.5% coupons have paid between 55 and 93 Constant Prepayment Rate (CPR) depending on year of origination.

Source: EMBS.com
Source: EMBS.com

The FHFA estimates close to one million more homeowners will be eligible to refinance under the modified program. The new HARP program should not cause a massive refinance wave. You will see prepayments increase in speed from 3% to 12% to different degrees across a variety of Mortgage Backed Securities. The prepayment increases in 30-year agency Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae mortgages should not be substantial or shocking to the market.  While speeds will increase in 2012, we believe current MBS prices have factored in this increase and the market is fairly valued. The HARP changes most likely will not be felt by the market until early 2012.

Christopher M. Priebe
Vice President, Mortgage Backed Securities Trader


To read the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac November 15, 2011 announcements, click on the links below:

  • https://www.fanniemae.com/mbs/announcements/2011/mbs_announcement_111511.jhtml?p=Mortgage-Backed+Securities
  • https://www.freddiemac.com/sell/guide/bulletins/pdf/bll1122.pdf

For more information, contact:

Joel B. Cramer, CFA
Director of Sales and Marketing
joel.cramer@aamcompany.com

Greg Curran, CFA
Vice President, Business Development
greg.curran@aamcompany.com


Disclaimer: Asset Allocation & Management Company, LLC (AAM) is an investment adviser registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, specializing in fixed-income asset management services for insurance companies. This information was developed using publicly available information, internally developed data and outside sources believed to be reliable. While all reasonable care has been taken to ensure that the facts stated and the opinions given are accurate, complete and reasonable, liability is expressly disclaimed by AAM and any affiliates (collectively known as “AAM”), and their representative officers and employees. This report has been prepared for informational purposes only and does not purport to represent a complete analysis of any security, company or industry discussed. Any opinions and/or recommendations expressed are subject to change without notice and should be considered only as part of a diversified portfolio. A complete list of investment recommendations made during the past year is available upon request. Past performance is not an indication of future returns.

This information is distributed to recipients including AAM, any of which may have acted on the basis of the information, or may have an ownership interest in securities to which the information relates. It may also be distributed to clients of AAM, as well as to other recipients with whom no such client relationship exists. Providing this information does not, in and of itself, constitute a recommendation by AAM, nor does it imply that the purchase or sale of any security is suitable for the recipient. Investing in the bond market is subject to certain risks including market, interest-rate, issuer, credit, inflation, liquidity, valuation, volatility, prepayment and extension. No part of this material may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission.

June 30, 2011 by

June 30, 2011

BankAmerica Agrees to Pay $8.5 Billion to Settle Mortgage Loan Litigation

 On June 29, 2011 BankAmerica announced that they had reached an agreement to make an $8.5 billion cash payment to settle litigation related to repurchase and servicing claims from the origination and underwriting of loans included in residential mortgage backed securities transactions issued between 2004 and 2008.  The litigation was initiated by 22 large institutional investors and covers 530 Countrywide, non-agency mortgage trusts with an original principal balance at issuance of $424 billion.  The cash payment will not be paid directly to the parties to the lawsuit but rather to the Trustee, Bank of New York Mellon, for the benefit of the covered trusts and all the investors in those trusts.  The settlement does not cover loans originated by Countrywide and other BankAmerica entities that were sold into non-Countrywide, private label mortgage trusts or loans sold to third parties.

The payment will be allocated among the covered trusts based upon the aggregate forecast losses of each securitization.  An expert firm, National Economic Research Associates (NERA), has been engaged to estimate total cumulative losses over the life of each transaction including both current as well as future losses.  Each trust will receive an allocable share of the $8.5 billion settlement based upon its pro rata share of the total aggregated losses of all the securitizations.  The net result is that those trusts experiencing the highest delinquencies and losses will garner the greatest share of the settlement.  The payment is subject to the approval of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.  Once the settlement is finalized and approved by the court, NERA will have 90 days to forecast losses for the trusts and allocate the settlement and thereafter BankAmerica will have 30 days to transfer funds to the Trustee.  Based upon the timely approval of the settlement by the court, which could take several months, funds should be disbursed to investors early next year.

Settlement amounts are to be paid directly into each trust’s certificate collection account and those funds will then be distributed to investors according to each securitization’s unique pooling and servicing agreement which stipulates the priority of principal repayment.  The amounts received will be treated as “subsequent recoveries” which effectively treats the proceeds as an unscheduled principal payment.  While not all securitizations are the same, this means that the majority of the monies will be disbursed as principal prepayments to current pay, sequential bonds and pass-through securities.  Longer dated NAS and locked out sequential bonds will receive little if any of the settlement proceeds.  The amount of the allocated settlement will also be used to reverse losses previously allocated to subordinate bonds in reverse order in which those losses were realized.  The subordinate bonds will not receive actual principal payments, but will have their outstanding balances increased to the extent that prior losses were reversed.  This will make the securities eligible to receive greater interest payments in future periods based upon a higher outstanding balance. There is an exception to this rule, however, to the extent that should all of the subordinate bonds of a transaction been written off and the senior bonds being allocated losses, then the subordinate losses can not be reversed and any balance increases are limited to the senior bonds.

While this $8.5 billion settlement is a considerable amount of money and represents a landmark win for investors, we believe that the recoveries by individual investors will be quite modest once the settlement is allocated across a large number of deals.  When compared to the approximately $97 billion in defaulted and seriously delinquent loans in the covered transactions, it’s fairly evident that this settlement will not go very far in covering the expected future losses on these transactions.

Please feel free to contact your AAM Portfolio Manager or Joel B. Cramer, CFA, Director of Sales and Marketing at joel.cramer@aamcompany.com should you have additional questions.

Written by:

Scott A. Edwards, CFA
Director of Structured Products

Disclaimer: Asset Allocation & Management Company, LLC (AAM) is an investment adviser registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, specializing in fixed-income asset management services for insurance companies. This information was developed using publicly available information, internally developed data and outside sources believed to be reliable. While all reasonable care has been taken to ensure that the facts stated and the opinions given are accurate, complete and reasonable, liability is expressly disclaimed by AAM and any affiliates (collectively known as “AAM”), and their representative officers and employees. This report has been prepared for informational purposes only and does not purport to represent a complete analysis of any security, company or industry discussed. Any opinions and/or recommendations expressed are subject to change without notice and should be considered only as part of a diversified portfolio. Past performance is not an indication of future returns.

This information is distributed to recipients including AAM, any of which may have acted on the basis of the information, or may have an ownership interest in securities to which the information relates. It may also be distributed to clients of AAM, as well as to other recipients with whom no such client relationship exists. Providing this information does not, in and of itself, constitute a recommendation by AAM, nor does it imply that the purchase or sale of any security is suitable for the recipient. Investing in the bond market is subject to certain risks including market, interest-rate, issuer, credit, inflation, liquidity, valuation, volatility, prepayment and extension. No part of this material may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission.

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Disclaimer: Asset Allocation & Management Company, LLC (AAM) is an investment adviser registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, specializing in fixed-income asset management services for insurance companies. Registration does not imply a certain level of skill or training. This information was developed using publicly available information, internally developed data and outside sources believed to be reliable. While all reasonable care has been taken to ensure that the facts stated and the opinions given are accurate, complete and reasonable, liability is expressly disclaimed by AAM and any affiliates (collectively known as “AAM”), and their representative officers and employees. This report has been prepared for informational purposes only and does not purport to represent a complete analysis of any security, company or industry discussed. Any opinions and/or recommendations expressed are subject to change without notice and should be considered only as part of a diversified portfolio. A complete list of investment recommendations made during the past year is available upon request. Past performance is not an indication of future returns. This information is distributed to recipients including AAM, any of which may have acted on the basis of the information, or may have an ownership interest in securities to which the information relates. It may also be distributed to clients of AAM, as well as to other recipients with whom no such client relationship exists. Providing this information does not, in and of itself, constitute a recommendation by AAM, nor does it imply that the purchase or sale of any security is suitable for the recipient. Investing in the bond market is subject to certain risks including market, interest-rate, issuer, credit, inflation, liquidity, valuation, volatility, prepayment and extension. No part of this material may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission. *All figures shown are approximate and subject to change from quarter to quarter. **The accolades and awards highlighted herein are not statements of any advisory client and do not describe any experience with or endorsement of AAM as an investment adviser by any such client.

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